The response to Hamas’s 7 October 2023 attack was not uniform across Arab and Muslim countries. Governments generally adopted a cautious diplomatic line, calling for an end to violence, protection of civilians and a two-state solution. Many Islamist movements, religious figures and sections of Arab public opinion framed the attack as resistance against Israeli occupation. Some governments and Islamic institutions explicitly condemned the killing or kidnapping of civilians.

Four layers need separating: official state positions, the positions of religious institutions and Islamist movements, public opinion and street protests, and later reactions to Israel’s military campaign in Gaza.

1. Immediate official reactions

Explore the governments by stance:

Sources for these positions include the Institute for Palestine Studies, UN General Assembly records and the Turkish Foreign Ministry.

Egypt and Jordan

Egypt emphasised de-escalation and coordinated with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, calling for an immediate end to confrontations and a political horizon based on two states. Cairo later became central to humanitarian diplomacy, border negotiations and hostage discussions. Jordan stressed civilian protection and international humanitarian law, placing the event in the context of occupation, settlement expansion and policies affecting Muslim holy sites. (Institute for Palestine Studies)

Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar

Riyadh was deliberately cautious. It did not celebrate the operation, but neither did it adopt the strongest Israeli and Western characterisation. The UAE combined condemnation of Hamas’s attacks on Israeli civilians with rejection of Israeli collective punishment, as recorded at the UN. Qatar placed primary responsibility on Israel’s occupation yet leveraged its Hamas ties to mediate.

Türkiye

Ankara’s first statement was measured: deep concern, condemnation of civilian deaths, restraint and a two-state solution. As the Gaza campaign intensified, Erdoğan and other officials became far more critical of Israel while Türkiye kept diplomatic and humanitarian channels open.

The Maghreb, Iraq and Lebanon

Morocco’s initial reaction was more balanced than Algeria’s or Tunisia’s, but its public and parties stayed strongly pro-Palestinian. Algeria and Tunisia used the language of occupation and “legitimate resistance.” Iraq’s government described the operation as the natural result of oppression, while powerful Shia political and militia networks backed armed resistance. Hezbollah’s border exchanges widened a Gaza war into a regional confrontation.

2. Non-Arab Muslim countries

Pakistan expressed concern at the human cost and urged protection of civilians, in a strongly pro-Palestinian but cautious statement. Iran celebrated the attack as a strategic success and a blow to normalisation, while denying direct responsibility. Indonesia and Malaysia backed Palestinian self-determination and condemned Israel’s campaign; Malaysia rejected pressure to classify Hamas as Western governments do. The Taliban voiced support for Palestinians, with little practical influence.

3. Religious institutions and Islamist movements

The sharpest gap lay between state diplomacy and religious or Islamist rhetoric, according to Aaron Zelin’s survey for the Washington Institute.

4. What Arab publics said

A survey by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies and Arab Center Washington DC interviewed 8,000 people in 16 Arab countries between December 2023 and January 2024. Reporting on the survey says 67% called 7 October a legitimate resistance operation and a further 19% called it flawed but legitimate.

These numbers need care. They reflect anger over Israel’s later conduct and perceived Western backing, not only views of 7 October itself.

5. Protests and media framing

Large demonstrations took place in Jordan, Türkiye, Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Pakistan, Indonesia and Malaysia. Demands included an end to Israeli operations, aid for Gaza, an end to U.S. support for Israel, Palestinian statehood, suspension of normalization and protection of al-Aqsa. Most mobilisation targeted Israel’s Gaza campaign more than it endorsed Hamas’s tactics.

Media framing diverged too. Research on Arab outlets, including the Moshe Dayan Center’s analysis, found Al Jazeera Arabic used the vocabulary of resistance and occupation, i24NEWS Arabic emphasised terrorism and hostages, and Sky News Arabia sat between them while placing more responsibility on Hamas.

6. Why responses differed

• Alliances. The UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, Egypt and Jordan had ties to Israel or the U.S. and incentives to condemn attacks on civilians. Iran, Hezbollah and allied factions saw a strategic blow against Israel and normalization.
• Domestic opinion. Even calm-seeking governments faced publics sympathetic to Palestinians, limiting condemnation of Hamas.
• Meanings of “resistance.” For many, the word did not mean approving the killing of civilians; for Israel and Western governments, the deliberate killings and hostage-taking made it terrorism.
• Israel’s response. Destruction, displacement, aid restrictions and civilian casualties shifted attention from the attack to the war.

The bottom line

• Arab governments mostly urged de-escalation, civilian protection and two states.
• The UAE clearly condemned Hamas’s attacks on civilians and called for hostages’ release.
• Qatar, Algeria, Tunisia, Iraq, Lebanon and some religious bodies blamed occupation and avoided condemning Hamas.
• Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Oman and Türkiye combined concern for civilians with support for Palestinian rights.
• Iran, Hezbollah and several Islamist movements celebrated or justified the operation.
• Public sympathy was driven largely by opposition to occupation and to Israel’s conduct, not unconditional approval of every Hamas action.

Sources

• Institute for Palestine Studies, “How Did Some Arab Countries React to the Aggression on the Gaza Strip”
• Aaron Y. Zelin, Washington Institute, Survey of Islamic and Islamist Responses to the Hamas Attack
• United Nations, Security Council briefing and General Assembly record
• Türkiye MFA, statement of 7 October 2023; Pakistan MOFA, statement
• Arab Barometer, changing Arab views
• Arab Center survey via Jewish News and i24NEWS
• Moshe Dayan Center, Arab media discourse; UGM media-framing research