President Joseph Aoun will travel to Washington on July 21st to meet with US President Donald Trump, carrying with him more than just a political or diplomatic agenda. He is going at a pivotal and critical moment, bearing the responsibility of ending the ongoing war between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, while simultaneously determining the future of the Lebanese Republic and its place in the coming phase.

This is not a mere protocol visit, nor simply another stop in the traditional relationship between Beirut and Washington. It is a true test — because the question facing Lebanon is no longer just how to end a new round of conflict or how to stem the bleeding of the crisis, but rather what kind of Lebanon it wants to be in the emerging new Middle East.

President Aoun understands that Washington, and especially the Trump administration, views Lebanon today from a different perspective: Can the Lebanese state regain its sovereignty and become a partner in shaping a solution, or will it remain captive to the power balances that have made it an open arena for regional conflicts?

Ending the war alone, however important, will not be enough. For Lebanon to maintain President Trump’s support for the Washington-sponsored negotiations — overseen by Secretary of State Marco Rubio — President Aoun needs to go beyond traditional demands and present a clear strategic vision based on two key elements that could constitute a turning point in Lebanon’s relationship with the United States and the international community.

In this context, the signals emanating from the Israeli side recently cannot be dismissed. Israeli Ambassador to the United States, Yechiel Leiter, stated that work is underway to develop a framework for a comprehensive peace agreement with Lebanon.

Lebanese may disagree on these proposals — which is natural in an issue of this magnitude and sensitivity. However, ignoring them is not policy. Countries do not wait for the opportune moment to begin thinking; they prepare for it in advance. If Israel is preparing for the post-war phase and holding a framework until conditions are ripe, it is also in Lebanon’s interest to have its own vision — rather than finding itself faced with options formulated by others.

While President Aoun was preparing to visit Washington, the NATO summit convened in Ankara, where Lebanon was absent from the list of invitees — but not from the calculations of regional and international players. The Lebanese issue was present in meetings between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President Trump, and Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, given the role played by US Ambassador to Turkey and Special Envoy to Syria and Iraq, Tom Barrack, who has become one of the most influential figures in shaping new American approaches in the region.

The real problem is not that others are discussing Lebanon’s future — the Lebanese have grown accustomed to this over decades. The real problem is that Lebanon finds itself once again a subject at the negotiating table, rather than a participant in shaping its own future.

The fierce opposition that President Aoun faces domestically is not merely about immediate political details, but about a deeper struggle over the identity and role of the state. Some forces believe that Lebanon’s continued inclusion within the Iranian sphere of influence — through Hezbollah’s ongoing role as a military and political force that transcends the state — is part of the regional equation. Another project posits that Lebanon’s salvation begins with the state regaining full sovereignty, eliminating all weapons outside its institutions, and establishing normal relations with its neighbors and the international community.

Lebanon has much to offer. It is not simply a security issue, a humanitarian crisis, or an arena for conflict between axes. It is a country possessing immense human, economic, and cultural resources — and a geographical location that can make it a bridge for communication, investment, and cooperation between East and West. But harnessing this potential requires, first and foremost, a clear decision: that the state becomes the sole authority, and that alliances are built on national interests, not external loyalties.

Between Ankara’s trap and Washington’s opportunity, the decision ultimately rests with Lebanon. Either Lebanon enters this new phase with a viable state-building project — or it allows others, once again, to dictate its future.