On July 28, 2026, Myanmar’s military-backed parliament passed the Anti-Online Scam Bill, authorizing the death penalty for those who use violence, torture, unlawful detention, or cruel treatment to force people into working in cyber scam operations — especially when such abuse results in a victim’s death. The legislation, the first major law enacted under President Min Aung Hlaing’s new government, formed after elections widely criticized as neither free nor fair, also imposes prison terms ranging from ten years to life for related coercion offenses, operating scam centres, or committing cryptocurrency fraud.

Union Parliament Speaker Aung Lin Dwe announced the bill’s passage during a joint session of the lower and upper houses in the capital, Naypyidaw. Lawmakers confirmed that key provisions from a May draft — published by the regime’s Central Committee for the Supervision of Online Fraud Prevention — remained largely intact, with few significant changes. The full final text has not been publicly released in detail, but it mandates capital punishment when coercive acts cause death, and life imprisonment as a maximum penalty for running scam centres or digital-currency scams. It also calls for cooperation with Interpol, Aseanapol, and foreign governments on extraditions.

The move comes as Myanmar has become a major global hub for industrial-scale online fraud, particularly “pig-butchering” romance and cryptocurrency investment scams that target victims worldwide. These operations generate enormous revenues while relying heavily on forced labour. According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, scam losses across East Asia, Southeast Asia, Australia, and New Zealand reached the figures cited above in 2025 alone, driven largely by Southeast Asian compounds, many in Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos. The International Organization for Migration has estimated that up to 300,000 people work in such centres across the three countries, with many trafficked via fake job ads promising high-paying tech or marketing roles. Workers often have their passports confiscated and face brutal quotas, long shifts, beatings, electric shocks, and solitary confinement.

“Operations have expanded even amid partial crackdowns — compounds relocate or decentralize rather than shut down.” Pattern observed across Myawaddy, Shwe Kokko and KK Park

The Scale and Operations of Myanmar’s Scam Industry

Scam compounds — often fortified, town-sized facilities with high-rises, private security, and even shops — have proliferated along Myanmar’s borders, especially near Thailand’s Myawaddy, Shwe Kokko and KK Park areas in Karen State, and near China in northern Shan State. Chinese-origin syndicates dominate their organization, recruiting or trafficking people from dozens of nationalities. Satellite imagery and investigations, including by Myanmar Witness, have identified well over 100 suspected sites, with many showing clear signs of forced labour and torture. Operations have continued to expand or shift even amid partial crackdowns, with compounds relocating or decentralizing rather than shutting down entirely.

Recent junta actions include demolishing buildings in major hubs, detaining and repatriating tens of thousands of foreign nationals — more than 14,000 in one recent border period alone, with most deported — and staging high-profile raids. China has executed multiple people linked to Myanmar-based networks and repatriated large numbers of suspects. The United States has sanctioned groups such as the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), formerly linked to the Karen Border Guard Force, for facilitating scams. Yet monitors note that enforcement remains incomplete, and the industry adapts quickly to pressure.

Root Causes: Civil War, Governance Vacuum, and Economic Incentives

The explosion of scam centres traces primarily to the aftermath of the February 2021 military coup, which ousted the elected government and triggered a protracted civil war that has killed more than 100,000 people and displaced millions. The conflict fractured state control, especially in borderlands long dominated by ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and militias — areas that already had histories of illicit economies in drugs, gambling, timber, and gems. Post-coup chaos, combined with weak institutions and porous borders, created ideal conditions for Chinese criminal networks to establish or expand fortified compounds.

Critics, including rights groups and UN observers, argue that criminal repression alone is insufficient without addressing the underlying conflict, corruption, and governance failures. The parliament is widely viewed as a rubber-stamp body, and enforcement may be selective — targeting certain operators while protecting others deemed strategically useful. Myanmar resumed judicial executions after decades in 2022, initially against activists; Min Aung Hlaing later commuted many death sentences upon taking the presidency, making the reintroduction of capital punishment for scam-related crimes notable.

Outlook

The law signals a tougher public stance and aims to deter the most violent forced-labour practices within scam compounds. However, with ongoing civil war, fragmented territorial control, and the industry’s proven resilience — operations continue expanding or shifting even under pressure — its practical impact remains uncertain. International cooperation on repatriation, sanctions, and financial tracking will be critical, as will broader efforts to stabilize governance and reduce the economic incentives that make scam compounds so attractive to armed groups and crime syndicates. Victims of both the scams themselves and the forced labour behind them continue to suffer on a massive scale, underscoring the human cost of a transnational criminal economy rooted in Myanmar’s unresolved conflict.