Every time a bomb goes off and the attackers cite religion, three arguments start at once. One says the faith itself is to blame. A second says the perpetrators have nothing to do with it. A third asks a practical question that rarely gets a straight answer: what actually works? This report takes each in turn, and stays close to the evidence.

The short version: violence in Islam’s name is real, Muslims are its main victims, scholars have built a detailed theological case against it, and Pakistan’s madrasas are neither the sole cause of militancy nor irrelevant to solving it.

For many Muslims, being linked to terrorism is among the sharpest injustices they face. It is also true that some armed groups deliberately use Islamic vocabulary, symbols and slogans to justify what they do. The honest response rejects two errors: denying that violence happens in Islam’s name, and concluding that Islam is therefore a terrorist religion. Accountability belongs with the individuals, organizations, commanders and governments who commit or enable crimes, not with a faith of more than a billion followers.

A religion is not the movement that borrows its name

Islam is a religion, a moral tradition and a way of life. The Taliban, al-Qaeda, ISIS and similar groups are political and armed movements. They pick particular texts, read them through their own ideology and use them to gain power. Their claim to speak for Islam has to be tested, not accepted on arrival.

The same standard applies to every faith. If a criminal gang calls itself Christian, Jewish, Buddhist, Hindu or Islamic, its label does not turn its crimes into that religion’s teachings. Applying this consistently does not mean Muslims should avoid self-criticism. When murder, sectarian attacks, forced displacement, torture or suicide bombings are carried out under Islamic banners, Muslims have a duty to condemn them clearly and to examine the interpretations, political conditions and social failures that let such movements recruit. Responsibility for confronting a problem is not collective guilt for causing it.

Muslims are among the main victims

Groups operating under Islamic slogans have killed large numbers of Muslims: Sunni, Shia and Sufi; scholars, children, worshippers, journalists, tribal leaders, aid workers and ordinary families. One study covering 1979–2024 found that 86.3% of recorded Islamist terrorist attacks and 88.9% of related deaths took place in Muslim countries. The numbers do not excuse killing non-Muslims, but they show why terrorism cannot be described as a war between Muslims and everyone else. [Fondapol]

“We are the real Muslims” is not proof

The Taliban, al-Qaeda, ISIS and sectarian militias have each claimed religious legitimacy, and each has accused other Muslims of disbelief, hypocrisy or betrayal. Armed rivals do not merely fight non-Muslims; they often declare fellow Muslims illegitimate. A claim to be the “real” Islam has to be tested against Islamic moral principles, not against a group’s name or propaganda. Use the tester below to try it on any group.

Sectarian hatred is a Muslim responsibility

The Sunni–Shia divide has caused terrible suffering in several countries. Attacking people for belonging to another Muslim sect is persecution and collective punishment, not a minor disagreement. The habits Muslim communities need to reject are familiar:

No sect should have to prove its humanity before it is protected, and Sunni and Shia lives cannot be valued differently. Islam includes diverse legal, theological, cultural and spiritual traditions. Disagreement does not require hatred, and conviction does not require violence.

What Islamic principles say

Muslims read their faith through the Qur’an, the example of the Prophet Muhammad, legal scholarship, ethics and centuries of interpretation. They disagree about many things, but core principles oppose the indiscriminate violence of terrorist groups. The Qur’an stresses the sanctity of life: killing one innocent person is likened to killing all humanity, and saving one to saving all (5:32). It commands justice even toward people one dislikes (5:8), forbids transgression (2:190) and rejects compulsion in religion (2:256).

These verses do not close the debate on war, self-defense, criminal law or political authority. What they do undermine is the idea that a faction can declare civilians legitimate targets, rule by terror and label every opponent an enemy of God. Classical rules of warfare also restrict harm to noncombatants and forbid treachery, mutilation, and the destruction of homes and crops. Whatever historians debate, modern terrorist groups cannot honestly present indiscriminate attacks and sectarian massacres as ordinary Islamic ethics.

Condemnation must be visible and consistent

Many Muslims reject terrorism privately, but private rejection is invisible to the wider world. After an attack, the perpetrators get global attention while the millions who oppose them rarely share the same news cycle. Ten commitments would close that gap. Tap each one you would hold your own institutions to.

Muslim-majority governments carry a further duty: to tell real security measures from collective punishment. Arbitrary detention, disappearance, torture, censorship and political exclusion create the grievances armed groups feed on. Beating terrorism takes policing, justice, education, economic opportunity and political reform, not military force alone.

The world has a responsibility too

Outsiders should use precise language, such as “al-Qaeda’s attacks,” “ISIS terrorism,” “sectarian militia violence” or “the Taliban’s policies,” rather than blaming Islam itself. Precision identifies criminals; vagueness stigmatizes populations. A Muslim child in Europe, Africa, South Asia, the Middle East or North America should not be treated as a suspect because a group claims to act in Islam’s name, and Muslims should not be asked to apologize for crimes they did not commit. Equally, rejecting Islamophobia must not mean denying real crimes or refusing to discuss extremist interpretations. A fair approach condemns terrorism without demonizing Muslims and challenges extremist ideology without treating criticism of violence as hatred of Islam.

Saying “terrorism is un-Islamic” is not enough, and serious scholars know it. Their response addresses the very arguments recruiters use to attract followers, justify violence and declare other Muslims unbelievers. The scholarly case shows that extremists misuse texts, break established principles of Islamic law, and appoint themselves authorities without the knowledge or legitimacy the tradition requires.

1. The sanctity of innocent life

Scholars start from the principle that innocent life is inviolable. Civilians, worshippers, children, women, the elderly, journalists, aid workers and prisoners are not legitimate targets because of their religion, nationality, sect or politics. A group may call a bombing “martyrdom” or an attack on civilians “jihad,” but scholars ask a different question: not what the action is called, but whether it meets recognized ethical and legal conditions. On that test, murdering civilians, turning suicide attacks into “sacrifice,” torturing or arbitrarily executing captives, collective punishment, and destroying homes, schools, hospitals and places of worship all fail.

The Amman Message, supported by leading Muslim scholars, explicitly condemned terrorism and stated that fatwas used to justify it violate the basic principles of Islam. [Amman Message]

2. Challenging takfir

Takfir, declaring another Muslim an unbeliever, is one of extremism’s most dangerous tools. Once a person or community is labeled apostate, violence against them is presented as permissible. Mainstream scholarship treats takfir as extremely serious. The Amman Message recognized followers of several Sunni, Shia, Ibadi and Zahiri schools as Muslims, prohibited declaring them apostates, and rejected the idea that armed individuals decide who belongs to Islam. [Brookings]

• A theological disagreement does not make someone an unbeliever.
• A political disagreement does not make someone an enemy of God.
• Nobody can be declared an apostate on the basis of rumor or propaganda.
• Even serious error requires knowledge, evidence, due process and qualified scholarship.

3. Who may issue a fatwa?

A fatwa is not a personal opinion, a social-media post, or an order from an armed leader. It is a legal opinion that demands training, methodology and awareness of circumstances. Militant groups present political orders as divine commands, quote isolated verses and bypass centuries of legal scholarship. Scholars answer that a person does not gain religious authority by holding a weapon, controlling territory or claiming to represent a caliphate. The Amman Message stressed that issuing fatwas needs recognized qualifications and that unqualified rulings authorizing terrorism are illegitimate. [King Abdullah II interview] This matters for young people, because recruiters often present themselves as the only “true” scholars and dismiss established learning as corrupt. Authentic religious knowledge, scholars reply, involves humility, consultation, legal principles, context and accountability, not confidence and dramatic language.

Eight recruiter claims and the scholarly reply

The following figure sets the main extremist arguments beside the way scholars answer them. It covers selective reading of scripture, jihad, sectarian supremacy, caliphate, martyrdom and the treatment of women and minorities. Tap a claim to see the answer.

Difficult texts are not avoided. A credible scholar does not pretend Islamic history has no wars or legal debates; the point is to separate historical circumstance, lawful authority and moral limits from modern terrorist improvisation. On sectarianism, Sunni, Shia and other scholars remind Muslims that the tradition contains many schools, and that disagreement has historically existed without extermination. They condemn attacks on mosques and gatherings, refuse to blame a whole sect for a political group, issue joint statements against violence, and teach students how sectarian narratives manipulate grief and anger. On minorities, the Marrakesh Declaration called for protecting the rights of religious communities and for cooperation beyond mere tolerance. [Marrakesh Declaration]

4. Where the argument is actually won

Ideas are not defeated by post-attack press statements alone. Scholars work through Friday sermons, seminaries and universities, online lectures, counseling for vulnerable youth, interfaith initiatives, rehabilitation for former extremists, support for families touched by recruitment, and training for imams on conflict, trauma and propaganda. The most effective ones do not just say “don’t join.” They explain how propaganda works, how texts are distorted, why takfir is dangerous and how young people can pursue justice without killing innocents. They also speak in language young people understand, since an accurate but inaccessible reply leaves a vacuum that emotional videos and simple slogans fill.

5. The limits of fatwas alone

Scholarly statements are necessary but not sufficient. Terrorism is also tied to civil war, authoritarianism, foreign intervention, corruption, unemployment, discrimination, prison abuse, social exclusion and online radicalization. The theological answer therefore has to sit alongside fair courts, accountable government, protection of minorities, quality education, jobs, responsible media, mental-health and family support, rehabilitation and reintegration, investigation of financial networks, and protection for scholars who oppose armed groups. If societies condemn extremist ideas but keep the injustices that help extremists recruit, the problem will continue.

Madrasas can play a real part in preventing violent extremism in Pakistan because they shape religious understanding, moral character and community attitudes. They should not be described as inherently extremist. Pakistan’s madrasas are diverse: most provide religious education and social services, while a smaller number have been criticized for sectarian intolerance, hate speech or links with militant networks. Research also warns against treating them as the sole or primary cause of militancy. [DTIC]

How many are “linked” to militancy?

There is no reliable, current, nationwide percentage of Pakistani madrasas linked to militant groups. The figure most often cited, 10–15%, comes from an old government estimate, and the sources that repeat it warn the data were unreliable. [DTIC]

• A Pakistani Ministry of Education estimate said roughly 10–15% of madrasas might have links to sectarian militancy or terrorism, but it was described as speculative and not based on a complete, verified census. [DTIC]
• The International Crisis Group reported the same range, stressing that the Pakistani government considered its own statistics unreliable. [Crisis Group]
• Brookings summarized it as roughly 10–15% affiliated with extremist religious or political groups, while warning against treating the whole sector as militant. [Brookings]
• Another survey found 18% of madrasas acknowledged sectarian affiliations, while only a few acknowledged links with militant jihadi groups. [PIPS]

The word “linked” hides a lot

“Linked” can describe anything from a training camp to a single alumnus who later joined a militant group. Select each meaning below.

These categories should not be treated as equivalent. A madrasa whose former student joins a militant group is not necessarily a militant institution, and a madrasa spreading sectarian hate speech may give no military support yet still help make violence easier to justify.

Are madrasas the main recruiting ground?

Research on militants themselves does not prove they are. A study cited by NACTA looking at militants in Swat found that madrasa attendance was not a significant predictor of recruitment, while family, social networks and personal inclination also mattered. [NACTA]

What madrasas do, and why it matters

Madrasas provide religious instruction; offer free or low-cost schooling to poor families; feed, house and support orphans; train imams, teachers and scholars; and shape opinion through sermons and community networks. In some areas they educate children where state schools are weak or out of reach. That social role cuts both ways. A madrasa that teaches compassion, justice, disagreement and civic duty can protect its students, and one that promotes sectarian hatred or glorifies violence can deepen conflict. The evidence is mixed, and institutions differ greatly in curriculum, management, affiliation and funding. Some studies do identify a smaller but significant group that spreads intolerance or serves as a recruitment environment. [Brookings]

Ten things madrasas can do

Policy: registration, standards and consistency

Pakistan’s National Action Plan identified madrasa registration and regulation as part of counter-extremism policy, and official planning included curriculum review, registration, financial oversight and removal of hate material. [NACTA Annual Report 2018] Reform, however, should not be confined to madrasas. Public-school syllabi in social studies, history, Pakistan Studies and Islamic Studies can also carry intolerance, conspiracy theories and sectarian stereotypes. [Peace Direct]

Approaches that can backfire

Two further explanations often come up in Pakistani discussions of why violence finds an audience. The first is that children who watch or take part in the yearly animal sacrifice grow less afraid of blood. The second is that Friday sermons in Pakistan are not uniform, and that in villages a single preacher can shape young minds and even sway elders unchecked. Both deserve a hearing. They also deserve the same test as everything else in this report: what does the evidence actually show?

Factor 1: the yearly animal sacrifice and children

Every year at Eid al-Adha, families across Pakistan sacrifice animals at home. Children often watch, and some take part. The argument is that seeing blood from an early age, sometimes with excitement, dulls the natural fear of violence. It is a question about childhood and desensitization, and it can be examined.

In short, researchers link cruelty to animals and exposure to household violence with later antisocial behavior. Ritual, regulated slaughter for food is a different thing, and none of the sources in this report ties it to militancy. What a responsible reading can take from the topic is a child-protection question: how old should a child be, who supervises, and what do adults teach about the moment? The Islamic answer is mercy, a swift and humane method, gratitude, and sharing the meat with neighbors and the poor. A review of halal slaughter practice even proposes that mosque sermons help raise awareness of humane slaughter and animal welfare. [ScienceDirect]

Factor 2: one sermon, many mosques?

The Friday sermon, or khutbah, reaches more people each week than almost any other institution. In much of Pakistan the preacher chooses his own topic. That gives good imams freedom to speak to local needs, but it gives a hateful one the same freedom, and in villages, where oversight is thinnest and few congregants can push back, one voice may go unchallenged. The sources here do not measure how much this shapes children or elders, so it is best read as a concern rather than a proven cause.

What Malaysia does

Malaysia is the model most often cited. Sermons there are standardized and coordinated by authorized state religious bodies. [UN in Malaysia] Texts are prepared by the federal Islamic development department, JAKIM, or by the state religious authorities, and are monitored. [Malay Mail] In 2025, JAKIM moved to standardize texts at the federal level so mosques stay free of political overtones, after Perak suspended four preachers for delivering unapproved sermons. [Malay Mail]

Where Pakistan already stands

Pakistan has therefore tried several times to guide sermons, but only in pieces. The reasons it has not become a single national system are practical as well as political: an Islamabad official noted that issuing and distributing written sermons to nearly a thousand places of worship in the capital alone would be hard. [Dawn]

This is why the argument for uniformity has to come with rules about what the uniform sermon may say. Otherwise the tool built to stop hate speech can be used to amplify it. Drawing on the reforms outlined in the earlier chapters, a workable Pakistani model would need:

Done this way, a common sermon framework would not replace religious scholarship. It would set a floor of mercy, justice, citizenship and the rights of others, above which imams still teach in their own voices.

Conclusion: the answers fit together

The chapters lead to one conclusion. Violence in Islam’s name is a fact, and the claim that Islam is therefore a terrorist religion is a false generalization. Scholars have built a serious theological case, grounded in the sanctity of life, the limits on takfir, the requirements for religious authority and the rights of minorities, showing why extremists cannot own the faith. And in Pakistan, madrasas are influential institutions whose effect depends on their leadership, curriculum, funding and environment.

The most constructive role for madrasas is to teach a confident, humane Islam: respect for life, rejection of takfir, protection of minorities, lawful disagreement, opposition to terrorism and service to society. Pakistan should support madrasas that promote peace, reform those that spread hatred, and hold criminal actors accountable without stigmatizing the whole sector. The aim is not to remove Islam from education, but to make sure religious education cannot be hijacked by those who use Islam to recruit young people into violence.

KR

Khurram Ali Raza

Writes for Faith & Freedom News on religion, extremism and public policy.