The problem in Lebanon today is not whether it negotiates directly with Israel or not, nor even the ongoing battles on the southern border, or the demarcation or negotiation files. The problem is much deeper: Who owns the Lebanese state? Who monopolizes its representation in war, peace, and negotiations — and who determines its course? This is especially pertinent at a time when the presidency and the government are attempting to reposition the state as a single center of sovereign decision-making.

The political-security establishment, led by the pro-Iranian Shiite duo in Lebanon — the Amal Movement and Hezbollah — effectively rejects this move, viewing it as a shift that threatens the internal balances through which it, along with the power of arms and the Syrian and Iranian occupations, has ruled Lebanon for decades.

The messages reaching Baabda Palace through circles close to this axis revolve around rejecting any negotiation process that doesn’t operate within the traditional internal power structures — as they have become accustomed to doing outside the constitutional framework. This rejection isn’t based on the principle of negotiation itself, nor even on Lebanon’s supreme strategic national interest.

The continuation of this reality presents the Shia community with a long-term strategic challenge — not only in its relations with the outside world, but in its position within the Lebanese state itself and its relationship with the other components of the country, should it continue to act against the logic of the state and the rule of law.

Ultimately, the essence of the crisis lies not in the form, venue, or with whom negotiations take place — but in the very structure of power within Lebanon. Any transition towards a unified state and the dismantling of the parallel power structure becomes a direct clash with a network of influence built up over decades. The question is no longer external. It is existential.