It constitutes the first clear and unambiguous Lebanese political recognition of the existence of the State of Israel within a framework leading to lasting peace. This is the language of ending a conflict that has lasted for nearly eight decades — and of opening a new chapter based on sovereignty, stability, and development, not on perpetual war.

This agreement is not the end of the road, but rather its beginning. However, it is a beginning unlike any that has come before.

If this path is implemented, it will lead to four transformations that would have seemed impossible just years ago:

The primary beneficiary, if this path succeeds, will be the Lebanese state itself. For the first time in decades, restoring sovereignty will become a practical project, not merely a political slogan.

The biggest loser is the project that was built on keeping Lebanon an open arena for regional conflicts: the expansionist project of the Islamic Republic of Iran. For decades, this project relied on transforming Lebanon into an advanced platform for influence outside state institutions and on establishing a parallel arms system as a strategic tool.

What is unfolding today is not merely an internal Lebanese transformation, but a broader redrawing of power dynamics in the Levant — where the system of influence built on transnational militias is gradually receding in favor of the logic of a centralized state and a single sovereign decision-making process.

It is precisely for this reason that Hezbollah appears today to be in its most precarious position since its inception. The party understands that the success of this agreement strikes at the very foundation of its military and political existence.

For over four decades, its legitimacy has been tied to the continuation of the conflict with Israel and to the notion that weapons outside state control are an existential necessity. But if withdrawal is achieved, ceasefire established, territories recovered, and the state alone becomes responsible for protecting borders, the question the party will face will no longer be external — it will be an internal Lebanese one: What justifies the continued existence of a military force parallel to the state when the pretext for its existence has vanished?

At the heart of this transformation stands the Lebanese military establishment. The Lebanese army is no longer merely a security institution within a complex political system — it has become the de facto standard of the state. The success or failure of this agreement hinges on its ability to enforce the state’s monopoly on the use of force and consolidate its authority over all Lebanese territory.

This is not a technical matter. It is an existential test: a test of a unified state in the face of a long-standing reality of overlapping authorities. In parallel, a deeper battle emerges: rebuilding state institutions from within — because restoring sovereignty is not achieved solely at the borders, but also within the public administration, security apparatus, and political decision-making centers.

This time, history is offering a rare window for the re-establishment of the state — a project that hinges on President Joseph Aoun’s visit to Washington in July to finalize it. The opportunity is real. The alignment is unprecedented. And the cost of hesitation has never been higher.