Foreign policy is rarely permanent. Nations may hold firmly to principles for decades, but circumstances change, regional alliances evolve, economies develop new needs, and national interests sometimes require governments to reconsider positions that once appeared unchangeable.

The history of India’s relationship with Israel offers an important example.

Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru were deeply sympathetic to the suffering of Jewish people, particularly in the face of European persecution, but they opposed the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine on the terms being pursued during the British Mandate period. Their position was strongly influenced by anti-colonialism, concern for the Arab population of Palestine, and India’s own struggle against British rule.

Yet independent India eventually changed course.

India recognized Israel in 1950 and, after decades of limited engagement, established full diplomatic relations with Israel in January 1992. At the same time, India did not abandon the Palestinian cause. It continued diplomatic relations with the Palestinians and maintained support for a negotiated two-state solution.

This transformation raises an important question for Pakistan:

Can Pakistan support Palestinian statehood and Palestinian rights while also opening diplomatic channels with Israel in pursuit of Pakistan’s own national interests?

There is a serious argument that it can.

Section OneGandhi and Nehru: Sympathy for Jews, Opposition to Imposed Partition

Mahatma Gandhi’s position on Zionism was complicated but clear in one important respect: his sympathy for Jewish suffering did not lead him to support the establishment of a Jewish national state through the displacement or political subordination of the Arab population of Palestine.

Writing in Harijan in November 1938, Gandhi argued that Palestine belonged to its Arab population and opposed what he regarded as the imposition of Jewish sovereignty through British power.

His argument reflected his broader philosophy of non-violence and his opposition to colonialism. Gandhi believed that a legitimate political settlement could not simply be imposed through military or imperial power.

Jawaharlal Nehru held a broadly similar position. Nehru viewed the Palestine question through the lens of anti-colonial nationalism. He sympathized with Jewish suffering but also recognized the political aspirations of Palestinian Arabs. In correspondence concerning the proposed Jewish state, he questioned whether a settlement imposed against the wishes of the Arab population could provide a durable solution.

For both leaders, therefore, the issue was not simply whether Jews had legitimate historical or cultural connections to Palestine. It was also about how competing national claims could be reconciled without injustice, coercion or displacement.

That distinction remains important today.

Section TwoIndia’s Foreign Policy Eventually Changed

The India of Gandhi and Nehru was not the India of the post–Cold War era. For decades after independence, New Delhi maintained a largely pro-Arab diplomatic position. India voted against the 1947 UN Partition Plan and initially opposed Israel’s admission to the United Nations.

Nevertheless, India formally recognized Israel in September 1950. Full diplomatic relations came much later, on 29 January 1992, under Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao.

The reasons were practical. The Cold War had ended. The international system was changing. India’s economic requirements were changing. Relations with the United States were becoming increasingly important. Israel had developed significant expertise in agriculture, irrigation, defence, technology and security.

India concluded that maintaining relations with Israel could serve Indian interests without requiring the abandonment of Palestinian aspirations. That decision proved significant.

Today, India maintains strong strategic, economic and technological relations with Israel while continuing diplomatic relations with the Palestinian leadership and publicly supporting a two-state solution.

Section ThreePakistan Chose a Different Path

Pakistan took a fundamentally different position. Since the establishment of Israel in 1948, Pakistan has not formally recognized the State of Israel and has maintained no normal diplomatic relationship with it.

Pakistan’s traditional position has been that recognition should come only after a just settlement of the Palestinian question. Pakistan has consistently supported the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, generally based on the pre-1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital, in accordance with relevant UN resolutions and international law.

This position has considerable historical and emotional importance for Pakistan. The Palestinian issue is deeply embedded in Pakistani public consciousness. Pakistan has also traditionally presented itself as an important diplomatic voice within the Muslim world and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.

For generations, Pakistan’s leadership has therefore viewed support for Palestine not simply as a foreign-policy calculation but as a matter of principle and solidarity. That position deserves to be understood rather than dismissed.

But foreign policy must also be examined through the changing interests of the country.

Section FourPakistan’s Diplomatic Role Should Be the Centre of the Debate

Pakistan should not approach the Israel question simply as a choice between “supporting Israel” and “supporting Palestine.” That is too narrow.

Pakistan has the potential to play a more constructive diplomatic role. Rather than abandoning Palestine, Pakistan could position itself as a country capable of maintaining dialogue with different sides of the Middle East conflict.

A country that has diplomatic access to Israel, the Palestinians, Arab states, Iran, Türkiye and other regional actors could potentially have greater — not lesser — capacity to contribute to regional dialogue.

Pakistan’s diplomatic tradition includes periods in which it maintained relationships with countries that had serious disagreements with one another. Its experience with the United States, China, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Türkiye and other states demonstrates that diplomacy does not require complete agreement with every partner.

Diplomatic relations are not declarations of friendship. They are channels through which national interests can be pursued, disagreements can be communicated and crises can sometimes be managed.

Section FivePakistan Has No Direct Territorial Conflict With Israel

One of the strongest arguments for reconsidering Pakistan’s policy is geographical reality. Pakistan and Israel do not share a border. There is no Pakistani–Israeli territorial dispute. There has been no conventional war between the two countries. There is no competing Pakistani claim to Israeli territory.

Pakistan’s most difficult security relationship in South Asia is with India — a country with which Pakistan shares a border, has fought multiple wars and continues to have serious disagreements, particularly over Kashmir. Yet Pakistan maintains diplomatic channels with India.

This does not mean Pakistan should automatically recognize every state with which it has no territorial dispute. It does, however, raise a legitimate question:

If Pakistan can maintain diplomatic engagement with a geographically close nuclear-armed adversary despite unresolved conflicts, why should diplomatic communication with a distant country automatically be regarded as impossible?

The answer cannot simply be historical hostility. It must be based on Pakistan’s current national interests.

Section SixThe Economic Argument

Pakistan faces serious economic challenges. The country needs foreign investment, technology, exports, agricultural modernization, water-management solutions, energy efficiency and new international partnerships.

Israel has developed internationally recognized expertise in several areas relevant to Pakistan’s needs, including:

• Agricultural technology and research
• Water conservation, drip irrigation, desalination and water recycling
• Cybersecurity and digital innovation
• Medical technology
• High-tech entrepreneurship
• Defence and security technologies

Diplomatic relations would not automatically produce these benefits. Nor should Pakistan assume that Israel would simply transfer sensitive technologies. But formal diplomatic channels could make legitimate cooperation easier to explore.

Pakistan should ask a straightforward question: can engagement produce practical benefits for Pakistani farmers, businesses, universities, technology companies and consumers? If the answer is potentially yes, then diplomacy deserves serious consideration.

Section SevenIndia’s Relationship With Israel Cannot Be Ignored

There is another strategic reality Pakistan cannot ignore. India has developed an increasingly close relationship with Israel, covering defence, agriculture, technology, intelligence cooperation, counter-terrorism and other areas.

Pakistan does not necessarily need to copy India’s foreign policy. But Islamabad must understand the strategic environment in which it operates. If a major regional competitor is developing extensive relations with an important technological and military power, Pakistan should at least have the diplomatic capacity to understand that relationship directly.

Section EightThe Muslim World Has Already Demonstrated That Positions Can Change

Pakistan would not be the first Muslim-majority country to reconsider its relationship with Israel. The United Arab Emirates and Bahrain established relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords. Morocco also restored formal relations, while Sudan entered the normalization process.

These governments did not necessarily abandon their support for Palestinian rights. Rather, they calculated that diplomatic and economic engagement with Israel could serve broader national and regional interests.

This does not mean Pakistan must follow the same model. Pakistan has its own political system, history, security concerns and public opinion. But these examples demonstrate something important: recognition of Israel and support for Palestinians are not necessarily incompatible foreign-policy positions.

Section NinePakistan Does Not Have to Abandon Palestine

Perhaps the greatest obstacle to the debate is the fear that diplomatic relations with Israel would mean abandoning the Palestinian people. That conclusion is not inevitable.

India provides one example. India has close strategic relations with Israel while maintaining diplomatic relations with the Palestinian Authority and supporting Palestinian statehood. Pakistan could potentially adopt a similar dual-track approach. It could say:

“Pakistan recognizes the right of Israel to exist as a state while continuing to support the legitimate political, national and human rights of the Palestinian people.”

Such a policy would not require Pakistan to endorse every action of the Israeli government. Likewise, maintaining relations with another country does not require Pakistan to endorse every policy of that country’s government. Diplomacy is built precisely because countries disagree.

Section TenRecognition Does Not Mean Silence

If Pakistan eventually decides to recognize Israel, it could establish its position clearly. Pakistan could continue to support:

• An independent Palestinian state
• A negotiated two-state settlement
• Palestinian political and economic rights
• Protection of civilians and humanitarian assistance
• Internationally recognized borders
• The status of Jerusalem being resolved through negotiations and international law
• Peaceful resolution of regional disputes

At the same time, Pakistan could maintain direct diplomatic communication with Israel — giving Islamabad an additional channel through which it could express its concerns.

A country usually has more influence over a relationship when it has a relationship than when it has none.

Section ElevenPakistan Could Become a Bridge Rather Than Another Polarized Voice

Pakistan has an opportunity to rethink its diplomatic identity. Instead of being seen exclusively through the lens of confrontation, Pakistan could attempt to present itself as a country capable of dialogue across political and religious divisions.

Its historical relationships give it a potentially unusual diplomatic position. Pakistan has close cultural and political relationships across the Muslim world, strategic relations with China, a long history of engagement with the United States, and relations with Arab states, Türkiye and Iran, alongside an increasingly important relationship with Central Asia.

Adding Israel to this diplomatic network would not necessarily weaken Pakistan’s position. If handled carefully, it could broaden Pakistan’s diplomatic reach — a more active diplomatic role than simply refusing contact.

Section TwelveDomestic Opinion Cannot Be Ignored

Any Pakistani government considering recognition of Israel would face a difficult domestic debate. Public sympathy for Palestine is extremely strong. Religious parties and many political groups regard recognition of Israel as unacceptable until the Palestinian question is resolved.

A sudden policy reversal could therefore produce political instability and accusations that Pakistan had abandoned a longstanding national principle. This reality should not be underestimated. Foreign policy is not conducted in a vacuum; a government must consider public sentiment, political stability and national cohesion.

For that reason, if Pakistan ever moves toward diplomatic engagement, the process would likely need to be gradual, transparent and carefully explained. The government would need to tell the public why it was changing the policy and what Pakistan expected to gain.

Section ThirteenA Gradual Diplomatic Road Map

Pakistan does not necessarily have to move immediately from non-recognition to a full embassy. There could be stages.

Such a process would give Pakistan time to assess costs and benefits rather than making a sudden geopolitical shift.

Section FourteenPakistan Could Link Recognition to a Diplomatic Initiative

There is another possibility. Pakistan could use recognition not simply as an economic or strategic transaction but as part of a wider diplomatic initiative. Islamabad could say:

Pakistan is prepared to consider diplomatic relations with Israel within a broader framework that advances peace, Palestinian statehood and regional cooperation.

This would give Pakistan an opportunity to transform what is currently seen as a binary question into a diplomatic proposition — encouraging Palestinian–Israeli negotiations, regional economic cooperation, humanitarian assistance, water and food-security projects, religious dialogue, protection of holy sites, youth and educational exchanges, and reconstruction and development in Palestinian territories.

In this model, Pakistan would not abandon Palestine. It would attempt to use diplomacy to increase its ability to contribute to the solution.

Section FifteenThe Kashmir Argument Requires Intellectual Consistency

Pakistan frequently compares the Palestinian question with Kashmir. There are historical and political differences between the two disputes, and they should not be treated as identical.

Nevertheless, Pakistan’s broader argument has traditionally been that peoples should have the right to determine their political future. That principle can remain part of Pakistan’s foreign policy even if Pakistan develops relations with Israel.

Indeed, maintaining diplomatic relations with countries that disagree with Pakistan on Kashmir has never prevented Islamabad from raising Kashmir at international forums. Pakistan could therefore maintain its Kashmir policy while establishing relations with Israel.

Diplomacy does not require a country to surrender its principles. It requires the ability to pursue those principles through multiple channels.

Section SixteenThe Real Question Is Not “Israel or Palestine”

The debate in Pakistan is often framed incorrectly, presented as a choice between Israel or Palestine. But the international system is rarely that simple.

The more realistic question is: can Pakistan have relations with Israel while continuing to support the legitimate national aspirations of the Palestinian people? India’s experience suggests that such a policy is possible. The UAE, Bahrain and Morocco demonstrate that Muslim-majority countries can establish relations with Israel while continuing to engage with the Palestinian issue.

Pakistan would still have to decide whether the benefits outweigh the political costs. But the question deserves serious national debate rather than automatic rejection.

Section SeventeenPakistan’s National Interest Must Ultimately Guide Foreign Policy

Pakistan has changed foreign-policy positions before. Its relationships with major powers have evolved according to changing circumstances. Relations with China developed from early diplomatic contact into a strategic partnership. Relations with the United States have experienced periods of cooperation and tension. Pakistan has maintained relations with countries with which it has serious disagreements.

Foreign policy therefore cannot be understood as a permanent list of friends and enemies. It is a continuing calculation of national interest. The same principle should apply to Israel.

Pakistan should ask: what does continued non-recognition achieve? And equally: what could diplomatic engagement potentially achieve? If the answers change over time, policy should be capable of changing as well.

Section EighteenA New Role for Pakistan in Middle Eastern Diplomacy

Perhaps the most important opportunity is not commercial. It is diplomatic. Pakistan has long sought recognition as an important Muslim country with the ability to contribute to international peace and stability.

If Islamabad eventually establishes relations with Israel while maintaining its commitment to Palestinian statehood, it could attempt to position itself as a country that talks to both sides. That would not automatically make Pakistan a mediator, nor should Islamabad exaggerate its ability to influence the conflict.

But having direct diplomatic channels would give Pakistan a voice inside the conversation rather than outside it — potentially advocating for peace while protecting its own economic and strategic interests.

ConclusionFrom Isolation to Strategic Engagement?

Pakistan’s historic support for Palestine should not be mocked, dismissed or forgotten. It emerged from genuine political, humanitarian and religious concerns and remains important to millions of Pakistanis.

But history should not become a prison. The world that shaped Pakistan’s original policy toward Israel has changed dramatically. India changed its policy. Several Arab and Muslim-majority states changed theirs. The Middle East has undergone major strategic transformations. Technology, water security, food security, investment, cybersecurity and economic competitiveness have become increasingly important elements of national power.

Pakistan therefore has a legitimate reason to reconsider whether complete non-recognition remains the best instrument for advancing its national interests.

Recognition of Israel would not have to mean rejection of Palestine.

Pakistan could recognize Israel, establish diplomatic relations, expand economic and technological cooperation, and simultaneously continue advocating for an independent Palestinian state and a negotiated two-state settlement. Indeed, diplomatic relations could potentially give Pakistan another channel through which to promote those objectives.

The goal should not be to become “pro-Israel” or “anti-Palestine.” The goal should be to become pro-Pakistan — a country capable of defending its principles while also protecting its economic, strategic and diplomatic interests.

Pakistan’s future foreign policy should therefore be guided neither by permanent hostility nor by blind alignment. It should be guided by national interest, strategic autonomy, diplomacy and the realities of the modern world.

The question Pakistan ultimately faces is not whether history should be erased. It is whether history should prevent the country from making rational choices about its future.

Pakistan can stand for Palestinian rights and still talk to Israel. Pakistan can support a two-state solution and still pursue its own economic interests. Pakistan can maintain its principles while expanding its diplomatic options.

And if circumstances eventually make recognition beneficial, a carefully managed opening to Israel could become not a betrayal of Pakistan’s diplomatic history, but an evolution of it.