Lebanon’s Recovery Cannot Begin
Until Sovereignty Is Restored
No IMF program, no banking restructuring, and no fiscal adjustment can offset the structural risk premium embedded into a state where the monopoly over the use of force is absent — writes Lebanese political activist Jowelle Michel Howayeck.
Lebanon’s economic crisis, as Jowelle Michel Howayeck writes on her X post, is not complex in its essence — but reducing it to fiscal indiscipline and banking mismanagement produces a technically neat diagnosis that fundamentally ignores the binding constraint on the economy.
No recovery model can function under dual authority. Capital does not price spreadsheets alone. It prices risk, control, and predictability. In Lebanon, all three remain structurally compromised by a reality that the international financial community continues to discuss with uncharacteristic delicacy.
“An economy cannot stabilize when the monopoly over the use of force is absent. Investors do not deploy capital where war and peace are not sovereign decisions.”— Jowelle Michel Howayeck, @JowelleHowayeck
Depositors, Howayeck argues, will not return funds to a system that operates under permanent geopolitical volatility outside state control. To refer to this reality simply as “armed conflict” — as many international reports do — misses the precise economic mechanism at play.
This is not an external shock that a resilient economy might absorb and recover from. It is a structural, persistent risk premium embedded into every Lebanese asset, every transaction, and every economic forecast published about the country.
The Structural Risk Premium
That premium translates into capital flight, dollarization, suppressed investment, and a permanently discounted economy. No banking restructuring, no IMF program, and no fiscal adjustment — however technically sound — can offset that fundamental distortion when left unaddressed.
The conclusion Howayeck draws is pointed and unambiguous: reform without sovereignty restoration is not a recovery strategy. It is a temporary stabilization attempt with diminishing returns — an internally coherent plan that markets will continue to render externally non-credible, and therefore economically non-viable.
Lebanon’s problem, in Howayeck’s framing, is not only balance sheets or bad loans or the collapse of the lira. It is the absence of a unified decision-making authority that markets can trust. Until that foundational constraint is removed, international capital will remain skeptical — and the country’s economy will remain in a structural holding pattern regardless of technical reforms undertaken.
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