We are witnessing a struggle over who actually governs Lebanon: the state as institutions and constitutional legitimacy, or the deep state as an accumulated system of influence that operates within and above the state — and reproduces itself through it. It is a battle to define power itself.

For decades, a dual system has existed in Lebanon: a formal state governed through institutions, and a de facto state operating through intertwined political, financial, and security networks positioned within the state rather than being subject to it. Over time, this structure became not an exception, but part of the governing mechanism itself — such that actual decisions are made outside the full constitutional framework and then passed through it.

Today, this model seems to have reached a critical juncture. Every attempt to re-establish the logic of the state — confining decision-making to legitimate institutions — is met with widespread political reactions, reflecting the extent of the fear of an actual transition that would change the rules of the system that has been in place for decades.

They all spoke their minds: foreign support — specifically from the Iranian Islamic regime, their only remaining patron after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria — is essential for their survival. For with the fall of Hezbollah’s power and the defeat of its illegitimate weapons, they will all fall — literally, not metaphorically. Their greatest fear at this moment is the approaching reckoning.

In this context, what is happening in Iraq stands out. There, the state is moving toward reasserting its authority: opening corruption cases, declaring next September a final deadline for disarming militias particularly those affiliated with Iran, and attempting to recentralize decision-making within legitimate and constitutional institutions.

Regardless of Iraq’s internal political details, the general trend is clear: the state is being reinstated as the sole authority. The era of armed groups across the Middle East is coming to an end — this is the blueprint for the new Middle East.

Striking data has emerged in public debate. A poll conducted by “International Information” shows that 84% of Druze support the path of the state, peace, and the state’s monopoly on the use of force. These figures are a political indicator of a deeper societal shift — in stark contrast to the declining logic of the parallel state.

This is not surprising after what the Druze experienced in 2008 when Hezbollah attempted to expand into their heartland, the mountains — and what the steadfast members of the community are experiencing today in their southern villages. The gap is widening between the social sentiment of the grassroots and the structure of the traditional political system that has governed Lebanon for decades.

What is happening is not a crisis of governance. It is a crisis of the state. Or more precisely: a crisis of defining who owns the state.

The political war in Lebanon today is between a state project trying to be completed under the leadership of the President of the Republic and the government — with unprecedented American, Gulf, and international support — and an old system that believes that the establishment of an actual state means its end, and therefore it is moving to defend its survival by all means.