Analysis By FFN Editorial Team
As representatives from more than 25 nations come together in Doha on December 16 for what could be a pivotal conference on the future of Gaza, the event is clouded by notable absences, unsettling contradictions, and crucial questions about who truly gets a voice when peace is at stake. The gathering, organized by the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) to plan an International Stabilization Force (ISF), embodies both optimism and overconfidence—optimism that a collaborative international effort can achieve what bilateral talks have failed to do, and overconfidence in thinking that peace can be crafted without the involvement of all key players whose support is vital for success.
The conference aims to clearly outline plans for an ISF that will disarm Gaza, enable the withdrawal of Israeli Defense Forces, and set the stage for enduring stability in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2803. However, beneath this diplomatic facade lies a more intricate and concerning reality. Israel, the nation whose security worries are said to underpin the entire stabilization initiative, hasn’t even been invited. Meanwhile, Qatar, the host country, faces accusations from critics of backing the very terrorist groups that the ISF is supposed to disarm. Additionally, Hamas, the militant group in control of Gaza, has already made it clear that it won’t give up its weapons until a Palestinian state is established—a condition that turns demilitarization from a feasible security strategy into a political deadlock.
This opinion piece delves into why this conference, despite its well-meaning goals, might represent a serious misstep in Middle Eastern diplomacy—one where the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion could jeopardize the very peace it aims to promote.
The Architecture of Exclusion: Why Israel Was Left Out
The decision to leave Israel out of the Doha conference is, on the surface, quite puzzling. Here’s a country that has been through three significant wars in Gaza, shares a border with the territory, and holds the power to veto which nations can send troops to the ISF.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has already voiced his doubts about the effectiveness of this force, openly stating that while it may be able to handle some tasks, the “main thing”—disarming Hamas—might be “beyond their abilities.” This isn’t just a minor player throwing in their two cents; this is a key player whose cooperation is crucial for the ISF’s deployment and overall success.
Yet, Israel won’t be present when crucial decisions are made about command structures, rules of engagement, and the makeup of the force. The reasons behind this exclusion shed light on the complex diplomatic challenges surrounding the stabilization of Gaza.
Israel Qatar Relations
The decision to hold the conference in Doha is more than just a choice of location—it’s a strange statement, and for many, it feels provocative. Since 2012, Qatar has been home to Hamas’s political leadership, a move that Doha claims was made at the request of Washington to keep lines of communication open with the group. Whether this narrative is entirely truthful or a bit self-serving, it has led to a tricky situation:
Qatar tries to play the role of an honest broker while also providing refuge to individuals that Israel sees as masterminds behind civilian casualties. The Israeli airstrike on September 9, 2025, which targeted Hamas officials right in Doha, marked a turning point in the already strained Qatar-Israel relationship. This attack was a clear demonstration of Israel’s readiness to confront its enemies without regard for diplomatic niceties, and it was a significant embarrassment for Qatar, whose territory was violated without any repercussions.
Qatar’s response—calling for an emergency Arab-Islamic summit and cutting off indirect communications with Israel—made it clear what everyone already knew: these two nations harbor deep-seated distrust for one another.
In this light, leaving Israel out of a conference in Doha isn’t so much a calculated diplomatic move as it is a recognition of the current state of affairs. Israeli officials probably wouldn’t feel safe in Qatar, and Qatari officials likely wouldn’t be eager to welcome them. However, this practical reality leads to a strategic mess: the conference turns into a gathering for Arab-Muslim consensus rather than a true multilateral negotiation that includes all the key players.
The Myth of Arab-Muslim Legitimacy
The ISF is intentionally structured as a force made up of Arab and Muslim-majority personnel, aiming to legitimize its operations in Gaza. The idea is that Palestinian civilians might be more inclined to accept security forces from countries that share their cultural and religious backgrounds rather than from Western nations. This isn’t an unreasonable thought; history shows that foreign forces seen as culturally similar often encounter less local resistance.
However, this focus on an Arab-Muslim makeup has led to its own complications. Turkey, a NATO member with a Muslim majority and considerable military resources, has shown interest in contributing troops. Yet, Israel has blocked Turkey’s participation, citing its support for Hamas and President Erdogan’s inflammatory remarks against Israel. This veto has also made other nations, hesitant to commit forces, as they are reluctant to engage in an operation that explicitly excludes Turkey, a fellow Muslim nation and regional power, at Israel’s insistence.
The outcome is a troubling situation: the push to form an Arab-Muslim force is being hampered by disputes between Israel and potential Muslim contributors, while Israel itself is left out of discussions where these issues could be addressed. Instead of fostering cooperation, the Doha meeting risks widening the gaps between key players whose collaboration is essential.
Qatar’s Credibility Crisis: Mediator or Sponsor?
One of the most contentious points of this conference has undoubtedly been Qatar’s dual role as the host and its alleged support for the very organizations that the ISF is trying to address. Detractors, particularly from pro-Israel groups and conservative American outlets, have been vocal in challenging Qatar’s credibility as a trustworthy player in the Middle Eastern peace process.
The Terror Sponsorship Allegations
The claims against Qatar are both extensive and precise. The Foundation for Defense of Democracies has documented what it describes as Doha’s “unreserved support” for Hamas, which includes financial assistance during the Second Intifada and hosting arrangements that go beyond just diplomatic support to include tangible material aid.
Detractors highlight statements from Qatari royals that minimize Israeli reports of Hamas’s actions, Qatar’s alleged financial backing of the Muslim Brotherhood across the Middle East, and its supposed support for groups ranging from Hezbollah to the Houthis and even the Taliban.
Max Abrahms, an international security expert, captured this sentiment sharply, labeling it “absurd” to hold discussions about stabilizing Gaza in a nation that sponsors Hamas.
Conservative commentator Joel Mowbray went even further, accusing Qatar of funding “every Islamic terrorist group and regime” while hypocritically presenting itself as a peacemaker.
The narrative that emerges from these criticisms suggests a pattern of systematic deception: Qatar is accused of using its significant natural gas wealth and strategic hosting of U.S. military facilities as a cover for promoting Islamist extremism throughout the region.
Most provocatively, reports have surfaced claiming Qatar hired a former CIA agent to discredit American lawmakers critical of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, including Senator Ted Cruz. If true, this would represent not merely diplomatic maneuvering but active interference in U.S. domestic politics to protect terrorist-designated organizations.
The Counter-Narrative: Pragmatic Mediation
Qatar’s defenders see these arrangements in a different light. They contend that hosting Hamas’s political leadership isn’t about sponsorship; it’s about creating crucial communication pathways that are essential for diplomacy. In this view, Qatar is taking on the challenging role of engaging with actors that the international community may find uncomfortable, but can’t afford to ignore if peace is the goal.
To negotiate ceasefires and facilitate the release of hostages, someone has to communicate with Hamas, and Qatar has willingly taken on this responsibility, even at a significant reputational cost. This perspective underscores that the United States specifically asked Qatar to assume this mediator role in 2012 because direct communication with Hamas was politically unfeasible for the U.S.
Thus, Qatar is seen as executing American policy rather than pursuing its own pro-Hamas agenda. The Doha Forum and other prominent gatherings are portrayed as genuine efforts to encourage dialogue on regional challenges, rather than mere propaganda for extremist causes.
The Reality: Both and Neither
The reality is often more complicated than it seems. Qatar plays a unique role as a U.S. ally, hosting a significant American military base, while also acting as a mediator in ceasefire talks and supporting Islamist movements that clash with American and Israeli security interests.
These roles can coexist; they illustrate Qatar’s strategy of “hedging diplomacy,” where it builds relationships across different ideologies to stay relevant, no matter which side comes out on top in regional disputes. That said, it’s understandable why critics of Qatar question its ability to host impartial conferences.
The airstrike on Qatari territory in September highlighted Israel’s belief that Qatar’s ties with Hamas go beyond mere mediation and into the realm of complicity. When a host nation is seen by a key player as actively supporting the opposition, the very choice of venue sends a message about which viewpoints are valued and which can be overlooked.
The Doha Forum: A Glimpse into Uneven Diplomacy
The CENTCOM conference doesn’t happen in isolation; it comes on the heels of the Doha Forum held on December 6-7, which showcased how the exclusion of Israeli voices influences regional discussions. This event, themed “Justice in Action: Beyond Promises to Progress,” attracted over 6,000 participants from more than 150 countries and sparked important conversations about Gaza’s future. However, it was notably unbalanced: while there was strong Palestinian representation from figures like Dr. Mustafa Barghouti and UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese, there were no official Israeli representatives to provide counterpoints or challenge the prevailing narratives.
One-Sided Discourse and Its Consequences
The result was predictable: sessions on Gaza became exercises in Israeli criticism without rebuttal. Discussions highlighted alleged double standards in enforcing International Court of Justice rulings against Israel, Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa accused Israel of “exporting crises,” and calls for Israeli withdrawal and accountability dominated without substantive Israeli perspectives to challenge these characterizations or present alternative frameworks.
Pakistani-American activist Anila Ali, president of the American Muslim and Multifaith Women’s Empowerment Council (AMMWEC), offered perhaps the most trenchant critique of this imbalance. After attending the forum, she challenged attendees to ask “an honest question through her social media accounts: Are we truly addressing the core issues facing the Muslim world, or are we still scapegoating and clinging to convenient myths?” She noted that conversations around Gaza were “deeply one-sided and heavily skewed,” with no Israeli voice present. “Without hearing from both sides of a conflict,” she argued, “no peace can be legitimate or enduring.”
Anila Ali further called for honest discussions about the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Hamas—”who they are, how they operate, and how their internal power struggles have held the future of the Palestinian people hostage for decades.”
Her observation that “most of the commentary on Palestinians promoted a single narrative, without acknowledging the complex political realities that have also contributed to their suffering” cuts to the heart of what makes exclusionary forums problematic: they create echo chambers where difficult questions about Palestinian governance, internal divisions, and militant group accountability can be politely avoided.
The Cost of Convenient Consensus
When forums exclude important stakeholders, they often find it easier to reach consensus, and that’s mainly because the voices that challenge the status quo are absent. If Israeli representatives can’t respond to accusations or explain their security policies, and if questions about Hamas’s governance and its use of civilian infrastructure for military purposes go unasked, the agreements that result aren’t true compromises. They simply reflect the preferences of those who were there. This isn’t a real dialogue; it’s just a way to reinforce existing beliefs.
The upcoming CENTCOM conference could easily repeat this pattern on an operational level. Without Israeli input on what constitutes acceptable force composition, rules of engagement that address genuine security concerns, or mechanisms to verify disarmament progress, the ISF plan emerging from Doha might be technically sound but politically unworkable. Israel has the power to veto contributors and can simply refuse to cooperate with any force it feels ignores its security requirements. Good intentions can’t change this structural veto.
The Hamas Problem: Disarmament Without Conditions
Beneath all these diplomatic intricacies is a key reality that could undermine the whole ISF concept: Hamas has firmly declared that it won’t surrender its weapons until a Palestinian state is formed. This position shifts what American and Israeli officials frame as a straightforward security step—demilitarization of Gaza—into a major deal that connects arms control with the quest for Palestinian statehood.
The Israeli-American Position
Israeli and American officials view Hamas’s position as entirely backward. From their perspective, demilitarization is not a precondition for statehood negotiations; it is a precondition for Israel’s willingness to withdraw forces and accept risk in Gaza. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s skepticism about the ISF’s ability to handle “the main thing”—disarming Hamas—reflects his belief that no international force will actually compel Hamas to give up weapons if Hamas remains unwilling.
This creates an irreconcilable sequencing problem. Israel demands demilitarization before withdrawal and any discussion of Palestinian sovereignty. Hamas demands statehood before disarmament. The ISF is caught in the middle, expected to achieve demilitarization that one party refuses to accept and that another party doubts is achievable. No amount of careful planning in Doha can resolve this fundamental impasse.
The Unasked Question About Palestinian Governance
Anila Ali’s critique of the Doha Forum’s failure to genuinely address the Palestinian Authority and Hamas really resonates here. If the ISF is successful in demilitarizing Gaza, who will take the reins? The Palestinian Authority, already weakened by corruption scandals and lacking legitimacy in Gaza, is unlikely to effectively manage the territory.
Even if Hamas is disarmed, it still has deep roots and considerable support among the people in Gaza. And let’s be real—international forces can’t govern indefinitely. However, these vital governance issues are largely overlooked in ISF’s planning, which zeroes in on the technical military task of demilitarization while treating political outcomes as someone else’s concern.
This is nothing more than diplomatic daydreaming. Demilitarization without a legitimate governing authority will just create a power vacuum that armed groups will eventually fill, kicking off the cycle of violence that the ISF is supposed to end.
The Trump Factor
The ISF emerges from President Donald Trump’s broader 20-point peace plan for Gaza, with Trump expected to announce a Board of Peace to oversee operations in early 2026. The administration has expressed optimism about deploying forces as early as January, with Indonesia offering up to 20,000 troops for non-combat roles and discussion of an American two-star general leading the effort.
Trump’s track record on Middle Eastern commitments is genuine and inspires many. Critics within his own political coalition have attacked the Doha conference and the ISF concept itself as betraying Israeli interests. Commentators in the “Monetized MAGA” sphere have mocked the ISF as an “International Destabilization Force” and accused the administration of prioritizing Hamas-friendly policies over Israel’s survival—rhetoric that suggests deep skepticism even among Trump’s political base about this peace initiative.
The Netanyahu Meeting: Reckoning or Rubber Stamp?
Trump is scheduled to meet Netanyahu at Mar-a-Lago on December 29, where Gaza’s future will be a central topic. This meeting occurs after the Doha conference, meaning ISF planning will have proceeded without Israeli participation but before any deployment. Netanyahu arrives at Mar-a-Lago armed with his public skepticism about the force’s effectiveness and private concerns about being excluded from planning that directly affects Israeli security.
The question is whether Trump will use this meeting to genuinely incorporate Israeli concerns or simply seek Netanyahu’s post-facto blessing for a plan already finalized in Doha. If the former, it raises the absurdity of excluding Israel from the conference only to renegotiate key elements bilaterally two weeks later. If the latter, it confirms that this is American-led diplomacy with minimal regard for Israeli input, likely straining U.S.-Israel relations at a moment when Trump presents himself as Israel’s strongest American ally.
The Paradox of American Leadership
The ISF represents a peculiar form of American leadership: Washington convenes the conference, provides the command structure, offers logistical support, yet deliberately excludes its closest regional ally from planning sessions while hosting discussions in a nation accused by that ally of sponsoring terrorism. This is neither traditional alliance management nor genuine multilateralism; it is something more awkward—an attempt to build consensus among Arab and Muslim nations while managing Israeli objections through separate bilateral channels.
US Ambassador to the UN Mike Waltz’s comment that rules of engagement will require “conversation with each country” and that the ISF is authorized to use force “if necessary” for demilitarization highlights another unresolved tension: Will forces actually engage Hamas militants who resist disarmament? If yes, the ISF becomes a belligerent in Gaza’s conflict rather than a neutral stabilization force. If no, disarmament remains voluntary—precisely Netanyahu’s concern that the force cannot handle “the main thing.”
Alternative Paths: What Could Have Been Done Differently
The fundamental flaw in the current approach is treating Israeli exclusion as an unfortunate necessity rather than a disqualifying defect. Several alternative approaches might have avoided this trap while still advancing ISF planning.
The Neutral Venue Solution
The most obvious alternative would have been selecting a neutral conference venue where Israeli participation was politically feasible. Recent Israel-Qatar meetings have occurred in New York precisely because neutral ground makes dialogue possible. Geneva, with its long history of hosting Middle Eastern peace talks, would have been an obvious choice. Cyprus, geographically proximate and maintaining relations with all parties, offers another option. Even holding the conference in Washington would have signaled American leadership while avoiding the provocative symbolism of Doha.
Critics might argue that Arab and Muslim nations would resist participating in an Israeli-present conference, but this objection proves too much. If these nations are willing to deploy troops alongside an Israeli-accepted ISF, they can surely attend the same planning conference as Israeli officials. The real question is whether organizers prioritized Arab-Muslim comfort over Israeli participation—a revealing choice that suggests whose buy-in was considered more essential.
The Virtual Participation Option
Even if physical Israeli presence in Doha was deemed impossible, virtual participation could have allowed Israeli officials to present positions, respond to proposals, and negotiate force parameters remotely. This approach has been used successfully in other sensitive diplomatic contexts where physical proximity creates security or political challenges. Virtual participation acknowledges practical constraints while preserving the principle that all essential stakeholders must be heard.
The failure to even offer this option suggests that Israeli exclusion was viewed not as an unfortunate necessity but as potentially advantageous—allowing conference participants to build consensus without navigating Israeli objections. This is politically expedient but strategically counterproductive, as any consensus achieved without Israeli input will likely collapse upon implementation.
The Phased Approach
A more sophisticated approach would have separated ISF planning into phases: initial Arab-Muslim consensus-building in Doha, followed by Israeli-inclusive sessions in a neutral venue, culminating in final trilateral negotiations involving Israel, Palestinian representatives, and ISF contributors. This acknowledges that different stakeholders have different comfort zones while ensuring no party is excluded from substantive negotiations.
Such an approach requires more time and diplomatic finesse than a single conference, but given the stakes involved—regional stability, thousands of potential ISF troops, and billions in reconstruction funding—the investment seems justified. The rush to finalize plans at a single December conference suggests either optimism that outstanding issues are minor or resignation that deeper consensus is impossible and symbolic progress must suffice.
Implications and Predictions: Where This Leads
The Doha conference will likely produce a technical framework for ISF deployment—command structures will be proposed, force size estimated, rules of engagement drafted. These documents will be professionally prepared and diplomatically vetted. They will also be largely irrelevant if key implementation challenges remain unresolved.
The Likely Outcomes
Delayed Deployment: The optimistic January 2026 timeline will slip as Israeli objections, Hamas resistance, and contributor nation hesitancy create delays. Each postponement will be attributed to “technical difficulties” rather than fundamental political disagreements, maintaining the fiction of progress.
Reduced Scope: If the ISF deploys, it will likely in a diminished form—fewer troops, more limited mandate, operating in zones where Hamas presence is already minimal. This allows claims of success while avoiding the “main thing” Netanyahu doubts can be achieved: actually disarming Hamas in areas where it remains militarily capable.
Ceasefire Fragility: Without genuine demilitarization progress, the current ceasefire will remain fragile, vulnerable to collapse from either Israeli operations against remaining Hamas capabilities or renewed Hamas attacks claiming to resist occupation. Each incident will generate calls for ISF deployment, which will be delayed by the very issues the Doha conference failed to resolve.
Strained U.S.-Israel Relations: Netanyahu’s exclusion from planning will complicate the Mar-a-Lago meeting and potentially damage U.S.-Israel coordination on regional issues. Pro-Israel voices in American politics will attack the administration for sidelining its closest Middle Eastern ally, while Arab states will resent any post-conference modifications made to accommodate Israeli concerns.
Qatar’s Emboldened Position: Hosting a successful conference, even one yielding only partial outcomes, reinforces Qatar’s position as essential Middle Eastern mediator. This benefits Doha’s regional standing while further entrenching arrangements that critics view as enabling extremism. The contradiction of Qatar’s dual role as mediator and alleged Hamas sponsor will persist unresolved.
The Risk of Escalation
What’s really worrying is the heightened risk of escalation that some analysts are pointing out. If Israel starts to see the ISF as not up to the task of handling security threats—or even worse, as a hindrance to its operations against the remaining Hamas capabilities—Netanyahu might decide to take unilateral military action, making ISF deployment impossible. There’s been a lot of chatter on social media predicting a “major Israeli escalation” tied to the outcomes of the conference, and that could turn out to be spot on if Israel believes that the Doha process will lead to an ISF that limits its operations without effectively disarming Hamas.
This sets up a troubling incentive: the more the Doha conference succeeds in building Arab-Muslim consensus around an ISF that operates without regard for Israeli security needs, the more likely Israel is to act preemptively to stop that force from being deployed. Ironically, the very exclusion intended to foster consensus might end up sparking the conflict it was meant to prevent.
Conclusion: Peace Cannot Be Curated
Anila Ali’s insight that “peace cannot be curated” really captures the core issue with the Doha conference. True peace demands tough conversations with parties that might be uncomfortable, recognition of competing legitimate interests, and painful compromises that might not fully satisfy anyone but provide enough for everyone to keep the dialogue going. Curated peace—where the guest list and discussion topics are carefully chosen—might produce polished statements and sophisticated frameworks, but it falls short of delivering lasting stability.
The CENTCOM conference showcases international diplomacy at its most ambitious yet flawed. It aims to establish mechanisms for stabilizing Gaza through inclusive multinational collaboration. However, it stumbles by sidelining the very stakeholder whose cooperation is crucial, holding discussions in a country whose neutrality is heavily disputed, and steering clear of the toughest questions surrounding Hamas disarmament and Palestinian governance.
The sad irony is that the motivations behind these decisions aren’t rooted in malice. Organizers probably thought that excluding Israel would encourage Arab-Muslim participation, that Qatar’s experience in mediation justified its role despite the controversies, and that technical planning could unfold independently of political talks. These choices are understandable tactical moves, but they could turn out to be disastrous strategic blunders.
To make real strides in Gaza, we need to face, not dodge, the toughest truths: Hamas won’t disarm voluntarily without political concessions that Israel is unwilling to make; Israel won’t agree to security arrangements that don’t address threats it sees as existential; Qatar’s dual role inevitably leads to conflicts of interest; and international forces, no matter how well-meaning, can’t replace the need for genuine political reconciliation between parties that still view each other as threats rather than allies.
The Doha conference might come up with some plans, structures, and timelines, but what it really can’t create is the trust and commitment needed to make those plans a reality. That kind of deeper work demands that all parties engage in honest conversations about their interests, fears, and boundaries. It means holding Qatar, Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, and Israel equally responsible for their roles in the ongoing conflict. It also calls for American leadership that’s ready to challenge both allies and adversaries instead of just trying to find common ground through selective inclusion.
Until international efforts are willing to take on this tougher approach, gatherings like Doha will only make headlines and spark hope without actually bringing about peace or stability. The region deserves more than that. So do the millions of Palestinians and Israelis whose safety and futures hinge on resolving this conflict, rather than just managing it through occasional diplomatic meetings that leave out crucial voices and dodge important questions.
When the conference wraps up on December 16, there will be statements celebrating progress. But the real challenge will come afterward, when we see if this progress is real or just another polished plan that falls apart when faced with the harsh realities it chose to ignore.
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