Diplomatic instinct suggests that, when conflicts intensify, parties should head to the negotiating table. That impulse might be rooted in genuine moral concern — but there are times when heeding it is dangerous. Now is just such a time: negotiations to end the Iran war today would be dangerously premature, naive, and likely to produce an outcome that all but guarantees another war.

Iran has given the international community little reason to trust it. Since the 1979 revolution that established the Islamic Republic, the regime has funded and armed proxy militias across the Middle East — including Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Hamas in Palestine — and pursued a nuclear program designed to hold the international community hostage. Iran has repeatedly negotiated in bad faith, used agreements to buy time, and treated diplomacy as a tactical instrument rather than a pathway to lasting resolution.

Hanging on by a thread — but still dangerous

Today, this regime is hanging on by a thread. Its leadership has been decimated, its military infrastructure is severely degraded, its economy is being strangled, and its population is exhausted. Some argue that the United States should take this opportunity to secure a swift and favorable deal with the Islamic Republic. But history argues otherwise.

This is the core risk embedded in President Donald Trump’s efforts to cut an immediate deal with Iran. Those in charge would likely present any agreement — regardless of its substance — as evidence of the Islamic Republic’s resilience and endurance. As soon as the attacks stopped, the regime would immediately start re-consolidating its power, rebuilding its proxy networks, and reconstituting its missile program, while continuing to terrorize its own people and destabilize the Middle East.

The JCPOA warning — a lesson not yet learned

The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action serves as a stark warning. Because the JCPOA was narrowly focused on curtailing Iran’s nuclear program, the regime was able to continue advancing its ballistic-missile program, its network of proxies, and its destabilizing regional activities — without violating the formal terms of the agreement. The Gulf states anticipated and warned against exactly this outcome.

While the JCPOA was being implemented, Iran continued testing ballistic missiles in defiance of UN Security Council Resolution 2231. Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s arsenal expanded from some 30,000 rockets and missiles to more than 100,000 by 2023. The lesson is unambiguous: a narrow agreement with a bad-faith actor simply creates space for the threat to metastasize in a different direction.

Trump’s gamble — and Iran’s counter-demands

Trump withdrew the U.S. from the JCPOA in 2018, yet his current administration risks repeating the same fundamental error in a different form. His administration claims to be engaged in “productive conversations” with Iran — but Iran’s leadership has challenged this characterization. When the Trump administration sent, through Pakistan, a 15-point proposal aimed at opening a pathway to a ceasefire, Iran countered with a list of demands that included reparations and sovereignty over the critical Strait of Hormuz.

More fundamentally, Trump appears to regard any agreement primarily as a commercial transaction rather than a critical arrangement with far-reaching implications for the Middle East’s future security architecture. Any deal shaped primarily by short-term considerations — such as stabilizing energy markets or securing a “victory” before November’s U.S. midterm elections — would generate serious long-term strategic consequences, not least by enabling the Iranian regime to rebuild.

The Gulf states’ clarity of vision

The Gulf states have shown far more consistency and strategic clarity than Washington on this question. Anwar Gargash, diplomatic adviser to the president of the United Arab Emirates, recently noted that Iran’s attacks on Gulf countries have “profound geopolitical implications” and demand strategic clarity, not appeasement.

Similarly, the UAE’s foreign affairs minister, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, articulated a firm stance that prioritizes long-term security over short-term concessions, stating unequivocally that the country “will never be blackmailed by terrorists.” The statement echoes a longstanding mantra of U.S. foreign policy — “We do not negotiate with terrorists.” Yet here we are, watching a U.S. administration scramble to cut a deal with a regime the United States has designated as a state sponsor of terrorism since 1984.

The right conditions for real peace

This is not an argument against pursuing peace. Peace remains essential — for the people of Iran, who did not choose this regime; for the people of Lebanon, who did not choose this war; and for the Gulf states, which face escalating security threats. Rather, this is a call for a more strategic approach that recognizes a fundamental truth: reaching a durable resolution, with the necessary scope and teeth, will be impossible until the right conditions are in place.

The concept of a “mutually hurting stalemate,” developed by the late Ira William Zartman, indicates that parties engage in meaningful negotiations only when continued escalation offers no viable path to victory and the status quo has become untenable for both sides. Iran is undoubtedly badly damaged — but its leadership has not yet demonstrated that it has reached this conclusion.

The UAE and its Gulf neighbors have earned the right to demand that their security is not traded away at a negotiating table where they have no seat, following a war on which they were not consulted. Any future settlement must address the full spectrum of the challenges posed by Iran. Anything less is not diplomacy. It is capitulation dressed in diplomatic language.

About the Authors Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy Mohammed Al Dhaheri Deputy Director General, Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy

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Rikard Jalkebro Associate Professor, Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy